Especial Overgefell: El emotivo párrafo final de la opinion de Kennedy

"Ninguna unión es más profunda que el matrimonio, por su encarnación de los más altos ideales de amor, fidelidad, devoción, sacrificio y familia. Al formar una unión marital, dos personas llegan a ser algo más grande de lo que alguna vez fueron.  Como algunos de los recurrentes en este caso demostraron, el matrimonio encarna un amor que puede durar incluso más allá de la muerte. Sería malinterpretar a estos hombres y mujeres decir que ellos no respetan la idea del matrimonio. Su alegato es que ellos la respetan, la respetan tan profundamente que ellos buscan su cumplimiento para ellos mismos. Su esperanza es no ser condenados a vivir en soledad, excluidos de una de las más antiguas instituciones de la civilización. Ellos piden igual dignidad a los ojos de la ley. La Constitución les otorga ese derecho."
(traducción mía)

Especial Obergefell: In defense of Justice Kennedy’s soaring language, por Michael C. Dorf

Michael C. Dorf is the Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law at Cornell University. He blogs at dorfonlaw.org

Professor Dorf served as a law clerk for Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and then for Justice Anthony M. Kennedy of the Supreme Court of the United States.

"In the nature of split decisions, the majority opinion makes an affirmative argument and the dissent criticizes that argument, with the majority responding, if at all, in footnotes and other asides. That pattern holds in Obergefell v. Hodges. In sometimes-soaring language, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion barely addresses the pointed and occasionally nasty critique leveled in four separate dissents, perhaps leaving the impression that nothing can be said in response.

That impression is false. None of the points made by the dissenters withstands critical scrutiny – not least the claim that because marriage originated as an institution to address accidental procreation by heterosexuals, a state has a rational (much less compelling) interest in forbidding gay and lesbian couples from participating in the modern institution of marriage.

Still less persuasive is the dissenters’ repeated insistence that this case differs from prior marriage cases because those cases did not involve the definition of marriage. To quote Justice Antonin Scalia’s acerbic dissent, “Huh?” Would the eight Justices who signed onto the fundamental rights portion of  Loving v. Virginia have reached a different conclusion if the Virginia statute defined marriage as an institution between a man and a woman of the same race?

Chief Justice John Roberts, in the principal dissent, sets forth the most elaborate argument, but fundamentally he makes three points: (1) there is a difference between support for same-sex marriage as a policy matter and as a constitutional matter; (2) premature constitutionalization of a right that cannot yet be said to be deeply rooted in the nation’s history and traditions risks undermining long-term support for the right because defeat of the anti-same-sex-marriage position in the democratic process would be more acceptable; and (3) the majority’s logic opens the door to claims such as a right to polygamy. Beyond that, his dissent repeatedly compares the ruling to Lochner v. New York, citing the case a whopping sixteen times.

Nearly all of what the Chief Justice says would work equally well as an argument against all unenumerated rights, indeed, against all judicial decisions that draw inferences from vague language contained in enumerated rights as well. The other dissents do not fare better.

Justice Clarence Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia) is more succinct but also more radical than the Chief. He rejects substantive due process in its entirety, but then, citing Founding Era and earlier texts, provides two fallbacks. To the extent that Justice Thomas would allow any substantive due process it would be for the liberty of movement only, and failing that, for no more than negative liberties. Marriage, as state recognition, would not be a fundamental right for anyone. Recognizing that, taken at face value, his view would require overruling Loving (in its fundamental rights aspect),Zablocki v. Redhail, and Turner v. Safley, he elevates the happenstance that those cases involved criminal prohibitions into central features, concluding that “in none of those cases were individuals denied solely governmental recognition and benefits associated with marriage.” Thus, two Justices of the Supreme Court apparently believe that, consistent with the Constitution, a state could forbid, say, people (even of the opposite sex) over the age of fifty from marrying.

Justice Samuel Alito (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) is chiefly concerned about people who oppose same-sex marriage on religious grounds. Will they now be required to participate in same-sex marriages? The short answer is no. As Justice Elena Kagan noted during the oral argument, even to Justice Scalia’s evident satisfaction at the time, clergy who solemnize marriages have long been given the freedom to decide which ceremonies at which to officiate based on criteria that would be constitutionally problematic in other contexts. As for others – such as religiously scrupled bakers and florists – absent (much-needed) legislation, the state action doctrine permits them the freedom to discriminate against same-sex couples.

And then there is Justice Scalia, who professes to worry about the ruling’s implications for democracy but seems more irked by Justice Kennedy’s prose style. In perhaps the most intemperate line in the U.S. Reports, Justice Scalia mocks the opening line of the majority opinion: “The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”

Justice Scalia replies: “If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opinion for the Court that began” in this way, “I would hide my head in a bag.” This from a Justice who – just in cases that are centrally relevant to the issue in Obergefell – once began a dissent by accusing the Court of mistaking “a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite” (as though Prussian anti-Catholic policies were an appropriate model for Colorado’s treatment of its gay and lesbian minority), in another dissentcompared same-sex intimacy to bestiality, and in a futile effort to read Loving as having nothing to do with evolving values, invented his very own inaccurate text of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Forget about the bag. Justice Scalia should not appear in public except in a full burka.

What bothers Justice Scalia and, to a somewhat lesser extent, his fellow dissenters, about Justice Kennedy’s soaring rhetoric? In prior gay rights cases, they have, with some justification, complained that the majority was unclear about how its holding fit with conventional constitutional doctrine, but there is little cause for complaint on that score in Obergefell. Justice Kennedy says with admirable clarity that marriage is a fundamental right and that the state has not offered a sufficient justification for denying it to same-sex couples.

Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia are puzzled by Justice Kennedy’s invocation of “synergy” between the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, but they ought not be. Especially not Justice Scalia, whose opinion in Employment Division v. Smith explained away prior cases that obviously contradicted the rule he announced there by describing them as resting on a “hybrid” of free exercise and other rights (including substantive due process!). Viewed from the window of Justice Scalia’s glass house, “synergy” is argle bargle but “hybrids” rest on a firm constitutional foundation.

Were the dissenters more interested in understanding than ridiculing the majority opinion, they would see that equal protection considerations help explain why a right to same-sex marriage does not necessarily open the door to polygamy, adult incest, and the other supposed horribles in their gay shame parade. With a few notable exceptions, for thousands of years people have been stigmatized, beaten, and killed for the sin of loving someone of the same sex. The dissenters regard this shameful history only as the basis for continued denial of constitutional rights. The majority, by contrast, sees in this history of subordination a special reason to be skeptical of the reasons advanced for excluding same-sex couples from the institution of marriage.

Justice Kennedy writes: “Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, th[e] denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.” It really is that simple.

Is it possible that some day we as a society will come to regard plural marriage in the same way? Sure. Just as a social and political movement led a Court whose Chief Justice once dismissed the idea of an individual right to bear arms as a “fraud” to change its mind about that constitutional right (as Reva Siegel has argued persuasively), so too a social and political movement for plural marriage could likewise succeed and if it does, the Court will follow suit.

Indeed, notwithstanding their citations of Magna Carta and The Federalist, even the dissenters appear to be evolving when it comes to gay rights. For all of his fulminating, at least Justice Scalia is no longer comparing gay sex to bestiality. Meanwhile, the Chief Justice was gracious in inviting the victors to celebrate their victory.

That is also precisely what Justice Kennedy was doing in a prose style that sometimes bordered on poetry. And as numerous pictures of celebrations around the country illustrate, it worked.

My gay and lesbian friends have no illusions that Obergefell marks the end of what one with whom I partied at a gay pride event in Brooklyn last night called their “liberation struggle.” We still need a federal antidiscrimination law. And as importantly, hearts and minds must continue to be won over.

But the Chief Justice is wrong in suggesting that only elections will do the trick. For better or worse, in the U.S., courts play a vital role in a complicated dance involving grass-roots activists, political organizers, elected officials, and ordinary citizens. Much work remains to be done with each of these constituencies but for now we can pause to celebrate a hard-won victory. Justice Kennedy’s opinion fittingly solemnized the occasion.

Recommended Citation: Michael Dorf, Symposium: In defense of Justice Kennedy’s soaring language, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 27, 2015, 5:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-in-defense-of-justice-kennedys-soaring-language/"

Citado desde ScotusBlog

Especial Ovegerfell: SCOTUS Obergefell et al v. Hodges

“Este fallo es una victoria para América”. Así comentó el presidente Barack Obama el fallo Obergefell et al v. Hodges, del que SCOTUS entregó su opinión ayer por la mañana, en quizá el fallo más importante de los últimos 30 años en EE.UU. y por sus repercusiones culturales, probablemente en buena parte de Occidente.

"The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protec­tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. Baker v. Nelson is overruled. The State laws challenged by the petitioners in these cases are held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples."

La opinión, de redacción del Justice Jennedy –un juez católico y nominado por Reagan, a más abundamiento- finaliza con uno de los párrafos más bellos sobre el matrimonio (va traducción en recuadro).

Los disidentes, encabezados por Roberts, no logran sustentar un argumento consistente y, como anota lúcidamente el profesor Michael C. Dorf, más bien se dedican a intentar ironizar. Scalia lo hace con ese mal gusto que lo caracteriza y Thomas una vez más yerra, es inconsistente con lo que él mismo ha escrito otras veces, y muestra que si hubiera estado en la Corte Warren, la segregación nunca habría terminado.

Scotus Obergefell Et Al. v. Hodges by Francisco Estrada

Seminario en Derecho UDLA sobre Ley Nº 20.830, Acuerdo de Unión Civil

Ayer en Derecho UDLA se realizó un seminario sobre la Ley Nº 20.830 destinado alumnos y alumnas de esa casa de estudios. Dejo aquí  la presentación de Luis Larraín, Presidente de Fundación Iguales y la mía sobre el tema.

Estudio Unicef: Hacia un Defensor de los derechos de la infancia para Chile

Nicolás Espejo ha tenido la amabilidad de compartir el estudio que recientemente encargó UNICEF Chile a Patricia Morales sobre el Defensor del Niño. 

En palabras del trabajo: 

"Este estudio tiene por objeto proveer de una propuesta para el establecimiento en Chile de un Defensor de los derechos de la Infancia (en adelante, El Defensor de la Infancia o Defensor del Niño). Así, en las siguientes páginas se revisan antecedentes, estándares y propuestas orientadas hacia la creación de un Defensor del Niño que reúna las siguientes características: (i) autónomo e independiente; (ii) con presencia regional y local; (iii) cuya función principal sea la protección de los derechos de los niños, niñas y adolescentes (en adelante, NNA), para lo cual se le debe dotar de una serie de competencias."

"El estudio sugiere que, en el marco del proceso de discusión de un futuro sistema de garantías para la protección integral de los derechos de la Infancia, la ley debiera establecer con claridad los elementos centrales del Defensor de la Infancia (naturaleza autónoma, funciones y competencias esenciales, mecanismo de selección del Defensor, hipótesis de remoción, obligación de cooperar con las funciones del Defensor y prioridad presupuestaria a favor de la institución, entre otras).

Respecto de sus funciones y atribuciones fundamentales, el Defensor de la Infancia debiera tener un mandato amplio en materia de derechos humanos y derechos de la infancia, con competencia para tramitar denuncias individuales y colectivas en relación a órganos públicos e instituciones privadas, formular recomendaciones, elaborar estudios orientados a promover el conocimiento de los derechos de los NNA y de la vulneración de los mismos, participar activamente en los procesos de elaboración de las políticas y la legislación de infancia y promover cambios en esas materias.

Este estudio se estructura en cuatro capítulos. El primero describe la figura del Ombudsman (Ombudsperson/ Defensor) en sus líneas generales y, en particular, algunos modelos de Ombudsman de la infancia en derecho comparado. En el segundo capítulo se enuncian las iniciativas legales que se han promovido en Chile en esta materia. En el tercer capítulo se sugieren alternativas para el diseño de la institución de un Defensor de la Infancia en Chile, a la luz de ciertas consideraciones constitucionales y administrativas fundamentales, y se describen las regulaciones de derecho público que en principio serían aplicables al Defensor de la Infancia. Las conclusiones se contienen en el capítulo cuarto."

Estudio Unicef: Hacia un Defensor de los derechos de la infancia para Chile by Francisco Estrada

Clase Criterios para la susceptibilidad de adopción

Este año nuevamente las magistradas Clara Worm, Pamela Lobos, Luz Rioseco y el juez Germán Núñez tuvieron la gentileza de invitarme a dar la clase sobre Criterios para la susceptibilidad de adopción en el curso de la Academia Judicial.

Agradezco a las juezas, jueces y ministros de Corte presentes sus preguntas y comentarios, y dejo aquí el ppt de apoyo de la clase.

Estrada 2015 Clase sobre Criterios para susceptibilidad de adopción from Francisco J. Estrada Vásquez